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Brokerage in commercialised healthcare systems: a conceptual framework and empirical 
evidence from Uttar Pradesh 
 
Abstract 
In many contexts there are a range of individuals and organisations offering healthcare services that 
differ widely in cost, quality and outcomes. This complexity is exacerbated by processes of 
healthcare commercialisation. Yet reliable information on healthcare provision is often limited, and 
progress to and through the healthcare system may depend on knowledge drawn from prior 
experiences, social networks and the providers themselves. It is in these contexts that healthcare 
brokerage emerges and third-party actors facilitate access to healthcare. 
 
This article presents a novel framework for studying brokerage of access to healthcare, and empirical 
evidence on healthcare brokerage in urban slums in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. The framework 
comprises six areas of interest that have been derived from sociological and political science 
literature on brokerage. A framework approach was used to group observational and interview data 
into six framework charts (one for each area of interest) to facilitate close thematic analysis. 
 
A cadre of women in Lucknow’s urban slums performed healthcare brokerage by encouraging use of 
particular healthcare services, organising travel, and mediating communications and fee 
negotiations with providers. The women emphasised their personal role in facilitating access to care 
and encouraged dependency on their services by withholding information from users. They received 
commission payments from healthcare programmes, and sometimes from users and hospitals as 
well, but were blamed for issues beyond their control. Disruption to their ability to facilitate low-cost 
healthcare meant some women lost their positions as brokers, while others adapted by leveraging 
old and new relationships with hospital managers. 
 
Brokerage analysis reveals how people capitalise on the complexity of healthcare systems by 
positioning themselves as intermediaries. Commercialised healthcare systems offer a fertile 
environment for such behaviours, which can undermine attainment of healthcare entitlements and 
exacerbate inequities in healthcare access. 
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Final author version 
2 
 
Brokerage in commercialised healthcare systems: a conceptual framework and empirical 
evidence from Uttar Pradesh 
 
Introduction 
People seeking access to healthcare often have to negotiate a complex and opaque landscape of 
service provision in which it is difficult to find reliable information on the cost and quality of 
healthcare and its alternatives, as well as its necessity and outcomes (Arrow, 1963; Gabe et al., 
2015). There are informational, social, financial and other practical barriers that prevent people from 
‘appearing’ at places of care, and the people who do reach places of care then face assessment on 
whether care should be offered or sought elsewhere (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006). It is a situation that 
has been aptly described as navigating a ‘healthcare maze’ (Collyer et al., 2015).  
 
This article focuses on the phenomenon of healthcare brokerage: intermediation of access to 
healthcare by ‘third-party’ actors who are external to healthcare providers and the immediate 
families of prospective users. The concept of brokerage has broad applicability in the healthcare 
sector yet its use has largely been limited to that of a descriptor for studying transnational 
healthcare arrangements, where companies and travel agents are described as brokering 
arrangements for ‘medical tourists’ (Deepa et al., 2013; Snyder et al., 2011). Other authors have 
used brokerage to describe knowledge transfer (Long et al., 2013), and the pressures of life at the 
interface between value systems in health, such as the nurse-led ‘culture brokerage’ between 
biomedicine and communities (Barbee, 1987; Jezewski, 1990), and community worker brokerage 
between governments and communities (Nading, 2013). A related body of work uses Michael 
Lipsky’s (1980) concept of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ to analyse the motivations and pressures for 
workers at the frontline of healthcare systems (Erasmus, 2014). 
 
This paper presents a novel framework for analysis of healthcare brokerage, and empirical evidence 
on healthcare brokerage in urban slums in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. The first section of this paper 
highlights healthcare commercialisation as an enabling factor for emergence of brokerage in the 
healthcare sector. Section two discusses insights that can be drawn from sociological and political 
science literature on brokerage, and identifies six areas of interest that provide particular insights 
into the phenomenon of healthcare brokerage and offer a framework for brokerage analysis. Section 
three introduces empirical research conducted in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, by outlining the setting 
and the methods used to generate and analyse data. The fourth section is structured using the six 
areas of interest for brokerage analysis and presents original findings on the strategies, rewards and 
pressures associated with healthcare brokerage. The paper concludes with discussion on the 
implications of brokerage for our understanding of healthcare and its provision, and suggests 
possible future applications of a brokerage framework in the study of healthcare. 
 
Brokerage and healthcare commercialisation 
Brokerage is a well-recognised phenomenon in economic literature, in which it is frequently 
analysed as a form of agency in which a ‘principal’ tasks an ‘agent’ to act on their behalf (Myerson, 
1982; Sappington, 1991). The term is commonly used to describe intermediating actors in 
marketplaces, and professional ‘broker’ firms thrive in service sectors characterised by complex 
systems of information and unpredictable changes, for example finance (Frye, 2000), insurance 
(Karaca-Mandic et al., 2013), and real estate (Searle, 2014). The companies match clients with one 
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another, facilitate purchases and arrange exchanges, and in return receive fees or commissions 
based on the size of transaction.  
 
The healthcare sector shares the characteristic complexity and uncertainty of other service sectors in 
which brokerage behaviours arise. There is detailed information on health issues, medical conditions 
and treatments (Gabe et al., 2015); substantial difficulties for obtaining reliable information on 
predicated healthcare costs (Arrow, 1963) and quality of care (Hanefeld et al., 2017), and an array of 
organisations and actors involved in the processes of providing care. Progress through this 
‘healthcare maze’ requires significant personal resources and some prospective healthcare users can 
draw on their prior healthcare experiences and on information from online sources and social 
networks, however many people lack the necessary resources, particularly those people who are 
from poor and other socially excluded groups (Willis et al., 2016). The need for support when 
accessing care has been recognised in some healthcare systems by the inclusion of ‘gatekeeper’ 
roles for health professionals to guide healthcare users and their decision-making, although 
gatekeepers are also able to perform exclusionary (Collyer et al., 2017) and abusive practices 
(Nandraj, 2015). 
 
Healthcare commercialisation processes exacerbate complexity in healthcare systems. These 
processes involve the expansion of healthcare markets and increased emphasis on models of 
provision involving cash income and private profit (Mackintosh and Koivusalo, 2005). 
Commercialisation has led to growing pluralism of public and private services in many healthcare 
systems (Bloom et al., 2013; Bloom and Standing, 2001). It undermines attainment of healthcare 
entitlements as prospective users are expected to perform roles as consumers of healthcare, 
exercising rational choice in a marketplace of providers (Tritter et al., 2011). While there is some 
evidence to indicate that socially and economically privileged groups in high-income settings are 
able to effectively exercise choice of healthcare provider (Willis et al., 2016), for other groups user 
‘choice’ is a more restricted concept (Gabe et al., 2015). Brokers offer a way to navigate the complex 
landscape of varying providers, services, costs and quality in order to attain healthcare entitlements.  
 
Social science approaches to studying brokerage 
There is extensive sociological and political science literature on brokerage behaviours and this body 
of work can inform the study of brokerage in the healthcare sector, where similar detailed 
examination of individual agency amongst brokers is lacking. Six key areas from sociological and 
political science literature are highlighted in turn below: the nature of brokerage activities; social 
relations between brokers and other groups; benefits to each group participating in brokerage; 
attempts by brokers to consolidate their position; personal costs of engaging in brokerage activities; 
and ways in which brokers react to changes in their context. 
 
The nature of brokerage activities 
Sociological analyses of networks have used varying interpretations of brokerage, ranging from the 
arrangement of ‘transactions’ (Marsden, 1982) to the influencing of ‘interactions’ more broadly 
(Obstfeld et al., 2014). They include catalytic tertius iungens behaviours that promote closer 
interaction between actors, and ‘middle-man’ tertius gaudens arrangements that facilitate exchange 
while maintaining existing divisions (Obstfeld, 2005). Studies of political brokerage pay particular 
attention to the nature of brokerage activities in systems of patronage and clientelism (Lemarchand 
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and Legg, 1972). Political ‘fixers’ – usually politicians or activists working on their behalf – control 
access to certain resources, which can then be leveraged in return for payments and votes. In many 
cases the resources themselves are publicly owned, for example subsidised food or electricity 
(Harriss-White, 2003; Jha et al., 2007), but are characterised by the presence of opaque eligibility 
criteria, convoluted administrative processes, over-burdened service providers and corrupt officials 
(Auyero, 2012).  
 
Social relations between brokers and other groups 
Brokerage behaviours develop amongst groups characterised by local cohesion (strong within-group 
ties) and wider fragmentation (absent or weak between-group ties) (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973), 
but also within groups with strong ties where there remains scope for new forms of collaboration 
(Obstfeld, 2005). The extent to which third-party actors can intermediate is determined by the 
strength of their relationships with the other actors (Gould and Fernandez, 1989), and so they foster 
good relationships with potential clients and may downplay certain relationships to avoid 
perceptions of bias towards one group or another (Stovel and Shaw, 2012). The brokers may operate 
alone, or may work as part of wider ‘problem-solving networks’ comprising a range of actors with 
varying strengths of ties and varying degrees of control over resources (Auyero, 2000). 
 
Benefits to each group that participates in brokerage 
In network analyses of brokerage, significant attention has been devoted to the personal benefits 
generated by intermediaries through brokerage activities, such as the commission payments they 
earn from facilitating transactions (Marsden, 1982). For political brokers, such benefits may extend 
beyond income to include votes and other forms of political support (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972), 
while brokerage of information within organisations may enable an intermediary to improve their 
professional reputation and accelerate career progression (Burt, 2004). There are wider potential 
benefits for engaging in brokerage as persons with knowledge of administrative and management 
procedures help prospective service users to negotiate bureaucracies (Corbridge et al., 2005; 
Harriss-White, 2003), even assisting service users in bypassing administrative systems or negotiating 
a reduction in fees. Meanwhile brokerage of information within organisations can improve 
communication and facilitate innovation (Burt, 2004).  
 
Attempts by brokers to consolidate their position 
The presence of alternative mechanisms through which actors can interact – either directly or 
through other intermediaries – weakens the negotiating power of a broker, while fewer alternatives 
to brokerage will strengthen the opportunities for brokers to promote personal benefits (Marsden, 
1982). Brokers may therefore seek to consolidate and protect their intermediary positions in order 
to preserve their personal benefits. Having used existing contacts and knowledge to develop a 
monopoly on access to information (Stovel and Shaw, 2012), brokers may then ostracise rivals and 
non-supporters to delegitimise criticism (Lieten, 1996). They deliberately withhold certain 
information from clients and potential rivals in order to protect their privileged position (Auyero, 
2000); a tertius gaudens orientation that sees brokers maintaining and promoting division between 
the actors seeking exchange (Wolff, 2011). Brokers may promote integration, or breed ‘exploitation, 
the pursuit of personal profit, corruption, and the accumulation of power’ (Stovel and Shaw, 2012, p. 
140). 




Personal costs of engaging in brokerage  
There are significant personal costs and reputational risks as a result of engaging in brokerage. The 
time and energy invested in performing brokerage may be significant and yet may not be adequately 
rewarded if a transaction fails to materialise, or an election is lost (Koster, 2012). By positioning 
themselves as a trusted agent for their clients, a broker becomes a target for criticism and political 
dissatisfaction in case of any problems (Bailey, 1969). This extends to accusations of prioritising self-
interests or of being ‘captured’ by the interests of one group (Stovel and Shaw, 2012). Such 
pressures are exacerbated in contexts where rival brokers operate and seek to consolidate their 
intermediary position by criticising and ostracising rivals (Lieten, 1996). 
 
Ways in which brokers react to a change in context 
The vulnerability and precarity of intermediary positions is exacerbated by the constant risk of 
change in the wider context. Loss of access to resources is a key concern, for example due to a 
breakdown in social relationships or an election loss. Some political brokers have responded to a 
party election loss by defecting to a new ruling party in order to preserve their access to public 
resources (De Wit and Berner, 2009). Yet there are also opportunities for other forms of brokerage 
that emerge due to contextual changes. Intermediaries can position themselves and their brokerage 
services within new social programmes (Auyero, 2000), or in the new markets that emerge following 
privatisation of public assets (Simon, 2009). It is in this area of activity that we can see how 




The data used in this paper were generated and collected in Lucknow, in the Indian state of Uttar 
Pradesh, as part of a doctoral study on the design and enactment of a voucher and contracting 
programme for maternal and reproductive health: the Sambhav scheme. The programme was 
funded by the US Agency for International Development and the Indian federal government and ran 
between 2007 and 2013 in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. Its designers aimed to 
increase uptake of maternal and reproductive healthcare by distributing vouchers that families could 
exchange for free services at accredited private hospitals, which would in turn be reimbursed by the 
programme (IFPS Technical Assistance Project, 2012). When the programme ended in 2013, 30,000 
maternal and reproductive health vouchers had been used in Lucknow, including more than 14,000 
antenatal care vouchers, 2,000 vouchers for care during childbirth and 3,000 postnatal care 
vouchers. 
 
Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand have some of the highest maternal mortality rates in India, and have 
commercialised healthcare systems dominated by user fees and an extensive private sector, 
particularly in urban areas. In these states the Sambhav scheme was launched shortly after the 
government’s Janani Suraksha Yojana (Safe Motherhood Programme), which offers 1,000 or 1,400 
rupees to a woman if she gives birth in an urban or rural government hospital, respectively. Pregnant 
women in Lucknow’s urban slums ostensibly had a choice between free government care plus a 
Janani Suraksha Yojana payment of 1,000 rupees, free private healthcare using the Sambhav 
scheme, or fee-paying private healthcare ranging from a few hundred rupees for a traditional birth 
attendant to several thousand rupees for care in a private hospital. Yet in practice they had limited 
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resources with which to inform decision-making in an exclusionary and often abusive healthcare 
system in which entitlements and even basic rights are frequently withheld (Coffey, 2014; Nandraj, 
2015; Sudhinaraset et al., 2016). 
 
The Sambhav scheme included a cadre of women ‘community health volunteers’ (CHV) who 
functioned as healthcare brokers. They were recruited by programme managers from within/near 
slum areas to raise awareness of the programme and family planning in communities, distribute 
vouchers, and accompany women to participating private hospitals. The age and education of CHVs 
varied widely, some were mothers with young children, while others were grandmothers; some 
were educated to secondary school level, others to master’s degree level. Their main household 
income came from their husbands’ work as craftsmen, running tea stalls and transporting materials, 
but the Sambhav scheme provided an important source of additional income.  
 
These CHVs were to receive commission payments from the Sambhav scheme, ranging from 5-50 
rupees per voucher submitted by someone from their local area, as well as regular monthly 
payments of 50 rupees to cover transport costs and 200 rupees to maintain programme registers. A 
submitted voucher had the name of the hospital, service user and CHV to aid tracking and prevent 
multiple uses. A group of 15 ‘assistant voucher coordinators’ (henceforth ‘supervisors’) were each 
responsible for overseeing the activities of 15-20 CHVs, and were in turn monitored by programme 
managers based in the District Innovations in Family Planning Services Agency (DIFPSA) and the State 
Innovations in Family Planning Services Agency (SIFPSA). 
 
The CHVs were given vouchers to distribute in an allocated area and perceived their facilitation of 
access to healthcare as a service in itself. They effectively controlled access to free maternal and 
reproductive healthcare at one of the accredited private hospitals, of which there were 17 in 
Lucknow when programme implementation was at its peak in 2012/13.  The ‘output-based’ system 
of commission payments to CHVs according to voucher usage was designed to incentivise voucher 
distribution and usage (IFPS Technical Assistance Project, 2012), and represented a commercialised 
approach to facilitating healthcare access in which emphasis was placed on performing activities in 
return for commission cash payments. This commercialised approach to brokering healthcare 
persisted even after the Sambhav scheme ended, as discussed later in the findings. 
 
Data collection and the brokerage framework analysis 
Ethics approval was obtained prior to commencement of the research (King’s College London 
application reference PNM/12/13-97 and Jawaharlal Nehru University Centre for Social Medicine 
and Community Health). Data were collected during three visits to Lucknow in 2013 and 2014. The 
author recorded observations as field notes and conducted 59 interviews with 41 people who were 
selected purposively based on type of involvement with the Sambhav scheme: programme 
managers, hospital owners and clinicians, CHVs and their supervisors, and voucher users. Data 
collection focused on two areas of the city where programme managers reported the Sambhav 
scheme to be functioning well, and respondents were contacted by the author or a research 
assistant, either by phone or in person while at home or at work, in order to request an interview at 
a time and place of their choice. Potential respondents were told about the aims of the research and 
asked if they would like to participate and to complete a consent form. They were asked if the 
interview could be audio-recorded and were instructed that they could withdraw from participation 
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at any time up until 1st April 2016. Pseudonyms are used throughout this paper. A research assistant 
who was fluent in English, Hindi and Urdu provided interpretation and translation services, and 
emergent findings were discussed with researchers based in India and the UK. Respondents were 
contacted during subsequent visits to Lucknow to arrange follow-up interviews. 
 
A framework analysis approach, based on the six areas of interest for healthcare brokerage analysis 
identified in the previous section, was used by the author to interrogate data from field notes and 
interviews. The process of analysis involved five steps: familiarisation, identification of a thematic 
framework, indexing, charting and interpretation (Pope et al., 2000). Rather than starting with open 
reading and coding for themes, a framework analysis focuses on specific issues using a pre-
determined set of questions. In the research reported in this paper, six framework charts were 
created, one for each of the six areas of interest: the nature of brokerage activities; social relations; 
benefits to each group; consolidation activities; personal costs; and changes in context. Within each 
framework chart, data from field notes and interviews were grouped into columns based on pre-
determined categories. Within each column a thematic analysis was performed to allocate 
descriptive codes summarising an action, behaviour, attitude or assumption. Additional columns 
were added to the framework charts if a new category was identified. The findings are presented 




The nature of brokerage activities 
Healthcare brokers can encourage use of specific healthcare services by reducing psychological 
barriers such as unfamiliarity, mistrust and even fear of providers. To this end CHVs in Lucknow 
provided information and assurances on the options available, boasted personal connections and 
offered chaperone services. They visited homes in their area to ask about the health of the women 
living there, invited women to come with them to hospital for maternal and reproductive healthcare 
services, and explained the benefits of skilled healthcare.  
 
Women who were potential service users seemed particularly concerned with the cost and quality of 
care, and their expectations were shaped in turn by the CHVs, who reported that their own 
persistence – to “motivate” or “convince” families – was important in overcoming mistrust. Families 
were told the likely costs of services at a hospital and this ensured that they would bring some 
money to pay and could not complain about unforeseen costs. While working in the Sambhav 
scheme, Shanaya told women that their care would be free but that they would have to pay for 
medicines and an HIV test (that was mandatory at Malhotra Hospital but not included in the voucher 
scheme), and Priya explained to women that they would need to pay for blood and urine tests. 
Personal assurances were used to convince women that they would receive good quality of care at a 
low cost. This was an important method for reducing mistrust of providers, and CHVs emphasised 
their personal role in securing such benefits: 
 
“if we meet a woman and she is in the third or fourth month [of pregnancy] then we tell her, 
we motivate her: ‘sister, our project provides free delivery in Malhotra Hospital, we will help 
you to get free services. We have a voucher from Sambhav that is run by SIFPSA and I will give 
it to you’.” (Prisha, CHV) 




Brokerage services included accompanying a woman to healthcare services during pregnancy and 
childbirth, ostensibly to ensure that she was treated well, and these activities emphasised the 
personal role of the CHV in accessing healthcare services. The CHVs were obliged to accompany a 
Sambhav voucher user during childbirth, but Anita, Prisha and Jyoti offered a wider package of 
services accompanying a woman for antenatal care, during labour and childbirth, and for postnatal 
care in return for additional payments from the families of users. Other CHVs accompanied women 
during antenatal care for strategic reasons that are discussed later, and the CHVs were also 
responsible for organising onward transport when a voucher hospital refused to provide care to a 
voucher user, usually because the hospital manager expected the cost of care to be higher than the 
value of the voucher reimbursement made to the hospital.  
 
The CHVs also offered to negotiate discounts for specific user fees at certain hospitals, and Jyoti 
described an example of how she helped a woman obtain discounted care at Malhotra Hospital: 
 
“There was a delivery case nearby and at Malhotra Hospital they said that the woman had to 
pay 4,500 rupees […] I asked the woman, first of all tell me whether you trust me or not.  She 
didn’t say anything. Then I told her that the voucher scheme had stopped, but she didn’t 
believe me and said that I must do something for her. Then I talked to one of the doctors and 
said that since the woman to give birth is poor and won’t be able to give much then let us give 
her a discount and allow her to pay 3,000 rupees. Then she had to pay only 3,000 rupees.” 
(Jyoti, CHV) 
 
Social relations of brokers 
The personalised nature of healthcare brokerage relies on maintaining personal connections and a 
positive reputation as someone who can be trusted. This is facilitated by a background of existing 
relationships and brokerage activities, and CHVs in Lucknow drew on experience and reputations 
generated through previously or concurrently held community positions in other donor-funded 
programmes such as Hindustan Latex Family Planning Promotion Trust’s (HLFPPT) Merrygold 
franchise network, or the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s Urban Health Initiative. Some CHVs 
had long-standing experience in facilitating access to healthcare, for example Anita had been 
accompanying women to a nearby hospital for 20 years. Another had previously distributed ration 
cards for government-subsidised fuel and food.  
 
Importantly, a healthcare broker must avoid being seen as untowardly biased towards one group or 
another, or risk losing their impartial status. One method is to maintain a public image of 
benevolence. CHV Aditi would give nutritional advice to women and would give sweets to their 
children in order to strengthen her relationship with families, while Anita explained that she was 
trusted by families because of the sacrifices she made to assist them: 
 
“When the child is born I stay during the night, I accompany them, that’s why they trust me. 
If somebody calls me at 1am and comes to my home, I go with them. They can go anywhere 
they want, whether it is a hospital or whatever. I don’t take money from them, I go there for 
service because we live in a village-like environment.” (Anita, CHV) 
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CHVs played down payments that they received from the Sambhav scheme in order to avoid 
accusations of bias. Priya and Prisha told women in Lucknow that they did not receive commissions 
for their “social work”, even though they did in fact receive payment, and an exchange with them 
provides a revealing example of the assumptions among local women about the income they might 
be receiving:  
 
Aditi: “I get nothing and they say to me ‘oh sister you are getting money.’ What are we 
getting? Whether we are getting something or not, you should come to the hospital. You 
should be happy and healthy. We have to do it like this to make them visit the hospital.” 
Priya: “The women say ‘give your introduction’ and they start asking about us. They say 
‘sister, you must be getting a lot of money, you must be getting commission.” 
Aditi: “Like this they talk to us. You will not take us seriously but the women think that we 
are getting 3,000-4,000 rupees. And they say ‘you get something’. They talk to us like that.”  
Priya: “And we tell them that we are doing social work, we are not getting money.” 
Aditi: “Her mother-in-law will say to us ‘go from here, nobody does social work, nobody can 
be trusted. This is government, nobody can be trusted.’ Like this they talk to us and they just 
shoo us away.” (Priya and Prisha, CHVs) 
 
Families who disagreed or quarrelled with CHVs were portrayed by them as ignorant. Aditi described 
some women she had encountered as “beehad”, a term sometimes used as an insult by insinuating 
that someone is from the neighbouring state of Bihar, which is regarded as less developed by some 
in Uttar Pradesh. The women had refused to accept assistance from Aditi. Such behaviours represent 
an attempt to discredit critical voices in order to maintain the reputation of benevolence and 
trustworthiness. 
 
Benefits of brokerage 
Healthcare providers benefit from brokerage activities through increased throughput of users while 
those users stand to benefit from access to healthcare services that might be otherwise unavailable. 
In the example of negotiated fees described previously, Jyoti’s claim to have spoken directly to a 
doctor at Malhotra Hospital in order to arrange reduced fees can be interpreted as evidence of her 
providing helpful assistance to a family who had limited confidence or power to negotiate with a 
hospital manager or obstetrician. That family benefitted from a 33% reduction in fees, when they 
might otherwise have to pay the full 4,500 rupees by selling possessions or borrowing money, while 
Malhotra Hospital benefited from the 3,000 rupees that the family eventually paid. The perceived 
commercial value for providers in Lucknow is indicated by the value of commissions that they paid to 
former CHVs after the Sambhav scheme ended, which were up to 600 rupees for accompanying a 
woman during childbirth. In one case, former CHV supervisor Kabir was hired as a ‘Public Relations 
Officer’ by Sri Krishna Hospital in order to encourage his network of former CHVs to continue 
bringing healthcare users to the hospital.  
 
Individuals and organisations that act as healthcare brokers can generate significant financial 
rewards from their activities, particularly if they have a near-monopoly on access to certain services 
and information. In Lucknow, CHVs in the Sambhav scheme received 50 rupees for accompanying a 
woman for care during childbirth, and occasionally received gifts from participating hospitals such as 
bags and cups. In addition to programme payments and hospital gifts, some received commission 
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payments from hospitals and families. The doctor at Malhotra Hospital openly acknowledged making 
payments to CHVs in addition to the money they received from the Sambhav scheme. As noted 
above, after the programme ended hospital managers paid the programme’s former CHVs up to 600 
rupees for bringing a pregnant woman for childbirth.  
 
Brokers based in communities can benefit in subtler ways, through their enhanced knowledge and 
local reputation. By developing a reputation as an experienced CHV, a broker can attract roles in 
future community projects. For example, Priya was an obvious candidate to be a CHV in the 
Sambhav scheme as she already operated as a peer educator in the Urban Health Initiative. Anita 
was able to use her existing reputation (as someone who accompanied women to hospital) to secure 
positions in the Sambhav scheme and the Merrygold franchise.  
 
Consolidation of the brokerage position 
The mediating position of healthcare broker is predicated on a lack of familiarity between users and 
providers, and a lack of appealing alternatives to brokerage services. In order to maintain that 
scenario, and consolidate their position, a broker can discredit alternative routes for seeking 
healthcare, restrict awareness in communities of the different healthcare providers and services 
available, and encourage their personal mediation of communications between users and specific 
providers. 
 
In Lucknow, it was widely acknowledged among Sambhav scheme staff that many women used the 
vouchers for antenatal care but then went to a government hospital to give birth in order to receive 
1,000 rupees through the Janani Suraksha Yojana. This practice meant CHVs missed out on their 
payment of 50 rupees for submission of a childbirth voucher, and some tried to discourage women 
from using government hospitals by making claims of better quality of care in the private hospitals 
for which they acted as an intermediary. As one explained: 
 
“They say that the medicines are free of cost in the government hospitals but we explain to 
them that […] although you have to pay a little bit for your medicines [in the Sambhav 
scheme], everything else is covered under this voucher. Please give up the temptation of 
1,000 rupees, what really matters is your health.” (Jyoti, CHV) 
 
In such cases, families who chose to use the CHV’s brokerage services were provided with limited 
knowledge to ensure the necessity of mediation. In some interviews, women voucher users 
appeared to have no idea that they had participated in the voucher programme. CHVs explained that 
they did not physically give vouchers to women. Ostensibly this was in case the voucher was lost or 
damaged, but it also allowed the CHVs to exaggerate the nature of their personal influence and in 
doing so create dependence. Rather than describe features and entitlements for the Sambhav 
scheme to its potential users, some stated simply that they were part of a programme for poor 
women to get free treatment at a nearby private hospital. 
 
CHVs mediated communications between users and providers on the basis that it reduces 
misunderstanding and facilitates healthcare provision, and Jyoti’s (one of the CHVs) claim earlier in 
this paper to have negotiated on behalf of users is an example of this. However this practice also 
reinforces the notion that it was their personal relationships and presence that produced the desired 
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access. As Jyoti noted, “the women keep on saying ‘since you have a good relationship with all the 
staff at the hospital, it is better if you take us to Malhotra’.” In this way brokers maintain a barrier of 
unfamiliarity and mistrust between the two groups to ensure continued demand for their services. 
 
By limiting awareness of programme entitlements, brokers prioritise their personal interests. In the 
Sambhav scheme, CHVs could limit choice of provider to their preferred hospital, which was often 
the nearest as that meant they (as well as voucher users) incurred lesser travel costs. As noted 
previously, some exploited their position of privileged access to healthcare by encouraging informal 
commission payments from hospitals and voucher users. The manager at one hospital had 
discovered that CHVs and hospital workers had also been collecting informal payments of up to 
2,000 rupees from voucher users. These incidents can in part be explained by programme designs 
that give control of a desirable and normally unattainable ‘commodity’ to people who themselves 
are poor and financially insecure. 
 
Financial and social pressures faced by brokers 
Although potentially lucrative, healthcare brokerage is accompanied by a series of pressures and 
risks that stem from the positions of individual brokers within their families and communities. CHVs 
in Lucknow faced up-front costs in order to perform brokerage activities which were particularly 
problematic as they themselves lived in low-income households. The cost of their transport when 
accompanying women to and from hospital was a particular burden as CHVs in the Sambhav scheme 
were eligible for just 50 rupees per month to cover all their transport, enough to cover one or two 
rickshaw journeys. They preferred to walk to and from the hospital with voucher users whenever 
possible, sometimes walking together as a group along the side of the road, and reported that they 
occasionally faced resistance from families who assumed they were given money for transport for 
each voucher user.  
 
There are also opportunity costs for the time spent away from other forms of work. In Lucknow the 
families of CHVs were supportive of the brokerage activities if it brought money into the household 
but became unsupportive (and even obstructive) if the work was not felt to be of value to them. 
CHVs cited instances of facing resistance from their family and one CHV described being “scolded” 
by her husband because she wanted to accompany a woman to hospital at night. Such problems in 
turn impacted on relationships between CHVs and their supervisors. Deepak described the difficulty 
he faced as a field supervisor with the husbands of CHVs: 
 
“it has become a battle with their husbands. Their husbands quarrel a lot. The husbands say 
‘no, no, they won’t work […] I don’t understand the work, at midnight she picks up the call 
and rushes. What kind of work is this? They work day and night. At the end the result is 
what? Nothing.” (Deepak, supervisor) 
 
An emphasis on personal services by brokers makes them a target for criticism when healthcare 
provision does not match expectations. In Lucknow, CHVs were held personally responsible for the 
actions of hospitals, over which they had little or no control, and one CHV described an incident in 
which she was blamed by a family because they were charged for care: 
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“The woman was pregnant and we went there and asked her to come with us to the hospital 
as we would ensure that no charges are taken from poor people, only the medicines you 
have to buy […] She had swelling in her legs so the doctor charged her 150 [rupees], instead 
of 300 [the ‘full’ price]. Her family were blaming us, saying that they were unfairly charged 
150, as we had earlier said it was free […] she said that ‘you people are all liars and making 
us look like fools’.” (Shanaya, CHV) 
 
Similarly, when implementation of the Sambhav scheme was interrupted in late-March 2013, CHVs 
lost their ability to offer low-cost care at private hospitals and bore the brunt of their communities’ 
frustration. CHVs were faced with accusations that they were withholding help, and Priya described 
an incident in which she was approached by a group of women from her area who demanded to 
know why they could no longer get free care at the Reddy Hospital. Prisha described the frustration 
of women who wanted care at Malhotra Hospital, and how she was blamed by them: 
 
“Everywhere in the field there is chaos about the vouchers […] They are saying we have 
stopped it for money […] the women are saying that we are hiding vouchers […] a patient 
asked me for a voucher and I told her ‘where I will get the voucher from?’ […] They say ‘you 
people tricked us, you told lies’.” (Prisha, CHV) 
 
Responses to changing contexts 
Healthcare brokers work within healthcare systems that are constantly shifting as the range of 
information, choices, and costs change, while new relationships and even brokers emerge. In this 
dynamic context, healthcare brokers face a constant threat of losing the privileged access that they 
hope to offer to prospective healthcare users, and respond by abandoning or adapting the services 
they perform. The closure of the Sambhav scheme in early July 2013 meant that CHVs lost their 
ability to offer low-cost care at private hospitals and needed families to be willing and able to pay 
higher fees at those private hospitals. That was particularly problematic for CHVs who operated in 
the poorest communities, where families were unable to afford the fees of private healthcare. The 
availability of free government healthcare services (plus the cash incentive of 1,000 rupees through 
Janani Suraksha Yojana) as an alternative to paid care in private hospitals was an important influence 
on family decision-making. As Lakshmi, a broker who operated in an impoverished community, 
noted: 
 
“My field is ruined. Who will trust me now? Women trusted me and they used to visit the 
hospitals. The scheme was stopped suddenly and where they should go for delivery? […] I 
told them to go to a government hospital and to get a card. This scheme has stopped and I 
can do nothing.” (Lakshmi, CHV) 
 
CHVs attempted to mobilise collectively to oppose the Sambhav scheme’s termination and demand 
its reinstatement. This was best evidenced by protest activities that took place shortly after the 
Sambhav scheme ended. On 9th July 2013 a group of 30-40 CHVs protested against the Sambhav 
scheme’s closure outside the offices of the programme management agency. A letter was 
subsequently sent to local politicians by a self-proclaimed ‘union’ for the CHVs, alleging that poor 
women were being ‘abandoned’ by the programme’s closure. The protest was covered in local 
newspapers and the letters were forwarded to the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister’s office, which then 
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wrote to programme managers to ask them to reconsider closure of the scheme. The efforts were 
ultimately unsuccessful and the programme remained closed. 
 
Some CHVs were able to adapt their brokerage services to the post-Sambhav healthcare 
environment by developing new relationships with private hospitals. Anita, Prisha and Jyoti 
continued to offer brokerage services by developing two options for families to seek care. They 
joined the Merrygold hospital franchise in similar commission-based roles known as ‘peer 
educators’, and also continued to accompany women to nearby former voucher facility Malhotra 
Hospital. Prisha explained how she offered the Merrygold hospital as a cheaper, albeit more distant, 
option for care: “I say to them that if you want delivery for half [price] then come to Merrygold. We 
call them and talk to them.” 
 
Hospital managers also took an active role in promoting continued brokerage. As noted previously, 
Sri Krishna Hospital hired former CHV supervisor Kabir as a ‘Public Relations Officer’ in order to 
maintain interest from nearby ex-CHVs and encourage their continued brokerage. Palash Hospital 
used their pre-existing ‘Public Relations Officer’ to contact ex-CHVs, while Malhotra Hospital utilised 
personal relationships with CHVs such as Anita, Prisha and Jyoti to offer increased commission 
payments. In this way the former CHVs could continue to earn commission payments as healthcare 
brokers without programmatic support from the Sambhav scheme. 
 
Discussion 
This article has set out a framework for analysing healthcare brokerage: a phenomenon in which 
access to healthcare is mediated by a third-party actor. Brokerage analysis offers a valuable tool for 
understanding how people access healthcare, and the framework in this article comprises six key 
areas of interest: the nature of brokerage activities; social relations that enable brokerage; benefits 
that different actors accrue; ways in which brokers consolidate their intermediary position; social 
and financial pressures that they face; and the ways in which brokers adapt to changes in the wider 
healthcare environment. The potential for generating insights from healthcare brokerage analysis 
has been illustrated here using empirical data from urban slums in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, where a 
cadre of women healthcare brokers organised travel, communicated with providers and negotiated 
fees on behalf of prospective healthcare users.  
 
The findings reveal how healthcare brokerage takes place in a commercialised healthcare system 
characterised by pluralism of services and unpredictable costs. Healthcare brokerage activities are 
potentially lucrative for the brokers themselves as it allows them to collect commission payments 
from multiple actors: service users, providers and healthcare programmes. Brokers emphasise their 
personal role in facilitating access to healthcare and encourage dependency on their services, but in 
doing so face conflicting pressures from their family and communities and are exposed to criticism 
and reputational damage in the event of any problems with the care provided; the same 
personalised relationships that permit brokerage simultaneously encourage personal attacks. This 
marriage of reward and precarity is a common feature of brokerage in social systems (Stovel and 
Shaw, 2012), but an unexplored element of existing research on healthcare brokerage (Deepa et al., 
2013; Snyder et al., 2011).  
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The presence of intermediating actors at the interface between communities and commercialised 
healthcare systems indicates a need for conceptualisations of healthcare systems to incorporate 
third-party actors operating with varying degrees of agency. The portrayal of healthcare systems as a 
marketplace of consumers and providers has become increasingly prominent in recent years (Bloom 
et al., 2013), yet an additional set of interests are introduced when relationships between users and 
providers are mediated by a third party. In this scenario, providers must consider how to attract and 
retain brokers as well as users, for example by using commission payments or gifts as hospitals did in 
Lucknow. Healthcare providers are likely to have little incentive to improve quality of care or reduce 
user fees if they can instead pay healthcare brokers to bring families to their facilities.  
 
Participation in brokerage arrangements offers rewards and risks for other actors in healthcare 
systems. Like formalised ‘gatekeeper’ roles in healthcare systems (Collyer et al., 2017), brokerage 
appears at first glance to offer a mechanism to improve the awareness of, and access to, healthcare. 
However such benefits may be restricted to those who can afford to pay brokers and/or hospital 
fees, while the need for some hospitals to cover costs of participating in brokerage means that 
commissions may simply be added onto fees paid by users. As such, brokerage may exacerbate 
inequities in access to healthcare, and even aggravate poverty caused by catastrophic healthcare 
expenditures. This is a particular concern in settings like Lucknow, where users were encouraged by 
brokers to pay for care at private hospitals rather than receive ostensibly free care and a cash 
payment at government hospitals. 
 
The empirical data used in this article were collected during three visits to Lucknow over the course 
of two years, thereby providing a detailed, longitudinal account of healthcare brokerage in one 
setting. There are other contexts in which similar commercial brokerage behaviours have been 
reported, notably transnational models for healthcare provision (Deepa et al., 2013; Snyder et al., 
2011). The rapidly growing market of companies offering digital platforms for healthcare booking 
(Dubey, 2017) and ‘concierge’ healthcare management services (Foster, 2016) is an area in particular 
need of closer study.  
 
Brokerage analysis can also be applied to the study of community-based health work. The 
intermediating role of community health workers is well-documented (Erasmus, 2014; Kok et al., 
2017; Nading, 2013), and Standing and Chowdhury noted how, in commercialised healthcare 
systems, community health workers can assist healthcare users to ‘negotiate pluralism and the 
market, to work out how to locate trusted forms of expertise’ (2008, p. 2105). Some behaviours 
described in this article have been similarly reported in research on community health work, 
including the promotion of dependency and extraction of payments (Abuya et al., 2012; Coffey, 
2014), and detailed study of healthcare brokerage activities in communities would be a valuable 
contribution to the growing body of literature on the roles and motivations of community health 
workers (Kok et al., 2017; Theobald et al., 2016). 
 
Conclusions 
Brokerage theories have been used widely in the study of politics and society for more than 30 years 
and yet remain under-utilised in the study of healthcare. In this article I have begun to address that 
gap by establishing a framework for healthcare brokerage analysis and applying it in the context of 
urban slums in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. The findings reveal a diverse set of activities that are 
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performed by brokers in Lucknow’s urban slums, as they arrange healthcare and communicate and 
negotiate with providers on behalf of families. The findings also reveal the financial and social 
pressures faced by the brokers, and the strategies they employ to consolidate and adapt 
intermediary positions in a context of poverty and precarity.  
 
A range of healthcare policies and interventions facilitate healthcare brokerage, particularly in 
commercialised healthcare systems, and the framework presented in this article provides a basis for 
detailed study on brokerage in different settings. In Lucknow we see how individualised results-
based payments to a cadre of community-based ‘volunteers’ encouraged brokerage activities and 
undermined attainment of healthcare entitlements for people living in urban slums. Brokerage 
influences the pathways through which people access healthcare, potentially exacerbating 
healthcare expenditure and poverty in the process, and such risks need to be assessed when 
designing healthcare policies and interventions.  
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